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Scholars' Reply to Professor Fried
As Solicitor General of the United States, Charles Fried, like any good
advocate, was often in the position of attempting to generate broad holdings from relatively narrow and particularistic Supreme Court decisions.
This was especially true in affirmative action cases. There, the Department of Justice argued that cautious precedents actually stood for the
broad proposition that measures designed to put members of disadvantaged groups on a plane of equality should, for constitutional purposes, be
treated the same as measures intended to stigmatize or subordinate them.'
The Supreme Court, however, has consistently rejected this reading of its
precedents and the broad proposition as well.
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,2 Justice Powell,
applying strict scrutiny, cast the tie-breaking vote in favor of the view that
the University's and society's interest in diversity justified racial preferences in education. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 3 the Court, again applying
heightened scrutiny, upheld a racial quota in the construction industry. In
Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v.
EEOC, 4 the Court, once more applying strict scrutiny, upheld a courtordered numerical "racial goal" tied to the percentage of nonwhites in the
5 again applying strict
relevant workforce. In United States v. Paradise,
scrutiny, the Court sustained a promotional quota on all upper ranks so
1. See Brief for the United States, Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (No. 841340); Brief for the United States, Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421 (1986) (No. 84-1656); Brief for the United States, United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149
(1987) (No. 85-999); see also Brief for the United States, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480
U S. 616 (1987) (No. 85-1129); Brief for the United States, Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (Nos. 82-206, 82-229). Compare the somewhat more cautious Brief for
the United States, taking precedent more seriously, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.
Ct. 706 (1987) (No. 87-998).
This understanding of the Constitution is captured by Fried's suggestion that "the equal protection
clause protects all equally." See Fried, Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.:
A Response to the Scholars' Statement, 99 YALE L.J. 155, 160 (1989). In one sense this is true, but it
cannot do the analytic work that Fried thinks it can. Even a cursory glance at the Court's cases
reveals that to be protected "equally" does not mean to be treated the same. See. e.g., Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see also Strauss, The
Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 99. As these cases-and indeed the entire structure of
equal protection doctrine-reveal, whether one has been protected "equally" depends not on whether
one has been treated "the same," but instead on the legitimacy and weight of the reasons for which
one has (or has not) been treated differently. It is here that the Court's decisions, including Croson,
recognize that affirmative action presents distinctive considerations.
2, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). In Fullilove, the plurality said that it need not decide between strict and
intermediate scrutiny, because the measure would survive either-an approach reiterated in some of
the other cases referred to in the text.
4. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
5. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
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long as there were qualified black candidates. Indeed, Paradiseinstructs
us that, upon solid findings of discrimination, principally at the entry
level, it is permissible to have afifty percent racial quota in promotion as
a means of eliminating the effects of past discrimination as quickly as
possible.
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,' the Court did conclude
that a preferential layoff provision was inadequately justified. Even there,
however, Justice O'Connor, applying strict scrutiny, emphasized that the
"imposition of a requirement that public employers make findings that
they have engaged in illegal discrimination before they engage in affirmative action programs would severely undermine public employers' incen'7
tive to meet voluntarily their civil rights obligations."
In his response, Professor Fried continues to claim that the Court's
complex decisions on affirmative action can be reduced to the relatively
simple proposition that race-conscious measures-whatever the context,
whoever the governmental actor, and whether the intended beneficiaries
are white or members of disadvantaged groups-are impermissible except
in the most extraordinary of circumstances. What Solicitor General Fried
maintained in briefs before the Supreme Court, about Bakke and Fullilove in Wygant and Sheet Metal Workers; and about Wygant and Sheet
Metal Workers in Paradise,Professor Fried now repeats, in these pages,
about Croson.8
The claim is unpersuasive. As our statement suggests, the law in this
area contains complex guidelines and enumerates relevant and irrelevant
factors rather than absolute rules.' Significantly, in Croson every other
member of the Court rejected Justice Scalia's view that affirmative action
should be treated the same as discrimination against members of racial
minority groups.1 0 A majority of the Justices continue to accept Fullilove,
which gives the national government vast power to create affirmative action programs. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Croson reads very
much like Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke-and Justice Powell voted to
uphold many affirmative action programs. Indeed, it is Justice Powell
who first put forth the idea that, in some contexts, forward-looking justifications will be sufficient to support such programs.1
6. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
7. Id. at 290.
8. See also Brief for the United States, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987)
(No. 85-1129).
9. See ConstitutionalScholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711 (1989) [hereinafter Statement]. Such an approach is unsurprising in
this difficult area, which covers a wide range of contexts for which rigid approaches would be illsuited.
10. Justice Kennedy expressed sympathy for Justice Scalia's position, but acknowledged that it
was inconsistent with precedent and said he was "not convinced" that the Court "need adopt it at this
point." Croson, 109 S.Ct. at 734 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
11. See also Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination:Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV.
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Finally, and most important, the decisive votes in Croson came from
Justices who emphasized context and particulars rather than bright-line
rules. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion stresses:
(1) Richmond's use of "an unyielding racial quota" rather than a racial
preference system with flexibility, including waiver provisions;"2
(2) the absence of a "prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory
violation by anyone in the Richmond construction industry"; 3
(3) Richmond's undue reliance on statistical evidence too broad or too
vague to be informative about discrimination in that industry;' 4 and
(4) Richmond's failure to consider alternative remedies' 5 or individual16
ized forms of relief.

Indeed, the plurality said that "a narrowly tailored racial preference
might be necessary to break down patterns of deliberate exclusion" on the
basis of a "significant statistical disparity between the number of qualified
minority contractors willing and able to perform a particular service and
the number of such contractors actually engaged by the locality or the
locality's prime contractors. . .. "'I It is in light of these considerations-stressing the highly distinctive context of the Richmond plan and
leaving room for race-conscious remedies in other contexts-that our
statement was written.
Fried suggests that Croson signals a substantial change in the law of
affirmative action because in that case a Supreme Court majority adopted,
for the first time, a test of strict scrutiny for all racial classifications. But
this overstates the implications of the case. As noted above, Supreme
Court majorities, or Justices whose votes were crucial to majorities, have
applied strict scrutiny, and upheld affirmative action programs, on many
occasions. Since what amounts to strict scrutiny has been applied in the
key opinions in all of the relevant cases, the use of that standard is hardly
surprising and, by itself, cannot plausibly be said to signal a major change
of direction. Strict scrutiny is as strict scrutiny does. Discrimination
against members of minority groups must overcome what is virtually a
L. REv. 78 (1986).
Croson, following Justice Powell's lead in Wygant, rejects the "role model" theory of affirmative
action; but it does not deal with the general question of forward-looking justifications. Justice Powell,
for one, rejected "role model" theories without rejecting diversity as a justification in education; see
also Justice Stevens' endorsement of forward-looking justifications in both Croson and Johnson.
12. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 724.
13. Id. at 724 (emphasis in original).
14. Id. at 724-27.
15. Id. at 728.
16. Id. at 728-29.
17. Id. at 729. Despite Professor Fried's discussion of "crystal balls," Fried, supra note 1, at 158
n.26, this language cannot be wished away simply because of the Court's later holding in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989)-a case presenting an altogether different issue-that
statistical disparity alone does not shift to the defendant the burden of justifying its employment practices under Title VII.
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conclusive presumption of unconstitutionality. 8 Affirmative action programs, even under strict scrutiny, need not do so.
Fried's disagreements with our statement primarily involve matters of
degree and emphasis. But if we read Fried correctly, he seems to think
that Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Croson implicitly overrules
Bakke, 19 represents a retreat from her position in Wygant,20 and may well
adopt the position of the dissents in Sheet Metal Workers and Paradise
(though he is not clear on this point).
In short, Fried appears to recast Croson as adopting precisely the views
of the Office of the Solicitor General on affirmative action-notwithstanding the fact that those same views have been frequently, and emphatically, rejected by the Supreme Court during the past
four terms. For a Court committed to judicial restraint, this would be
exceptionally surprising.
Affirmative action programs have been approved, time and again, by
the American people acting through the democratic branches of government-and at the national, state, and local level. In at least some forms,
they have been approved by the Supreme Court. They are now firmly
embedded in American practice and American law, and they span an
enormous range. To cite just two examples: (1) Executive Order No.
11,246-involving government contracts, written by President Johnson
and enforced by Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan and
Bush-contains one of the most important affirmative action programs;2 1
(2) thousands of public educational institutions,22 attempting to provide a
more diverse group of students and faculty, have, of their own volition,
followed Justice Powell's direction not to adopt quotas but instead to consider minority status as one among many relevant factors.
To think that Croson imposes a national constitutional barrier-to be
enforced by federal judges-to such programs would be to read it as a
startling departure from the Court's cautious approach to the difficult
problem of remedying the long legacy of discrimination against members
of minority groups. We prefer to see Croson as the pragmatic and particularistic opinion that it is.

18. The only exception is Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which of course
involved the highly unusual circumstance of a military exclusion order.
19. Fried, supra note 1, at 158-59.
20. Id. at 160.
21. Exec. Order 11,246, (1965), 3 C.F.R. 339, (1964-65) reprintedin 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at
28-31 (1982). On October 13, 1967, the order was expanded to include gender. See Exec. Order
11,375, (1967), 3 C.F.R. 320 reprinted in U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 28-31 (1982).
22. Fried notes, correctly, that Croson does not directly bear on the conduct of private actors. But
if one took the view that Fried expressed as Solicitor General, see Briefs for the United States in
Johnson and Paradise,supra note 1, the Civil Rights Acts would be read as a bar to race-conscious
private behavior. That is a reading and a view also rejected-with emphasis-by the Court. See
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149

(1987).
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